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N~TURE OP CASB 
DISPOSI '1'ION OP CASE IN LOWER COURr • • 
NATURE OP RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
srr ATEME! NT 0 2' FACTS • • • • 
A.RGU MENT 
I. AS A RSGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY, MOUNTAIN 
BELL CANNOT BE E-IELD LIABLE IN DAMAGES 2"QR 
ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH A VALID TARIFF OR 
'1'AKEN !N COMPT.JIANCE WITH 1'HE ORDERS OF 
THE PUBLIC SB RV ICE CO MMI SS I 0 N • 
A. The statutes of this state grant the 
Public Serivce Commission broad powers 
to regulate utilities, approve tariEf 
regulations and issue orders. such 
1 
1 
2 
2 
8 
tariff regulations and orders have the 
force and effect of law. • . . . • . • 9 
B. 
,., 
~. 
As tariffs are the law, the trial 
court erred in refusing to hold that 
because of lawful tariffs, ~he 
Atkin firm did not have a.property 
right in the telephone number assigned 
to it, and that Mountain Bell could 
lawfully change the number without 
liability. • • • • . • • • . . • . • 10 
The o~der of the Public Service 
Commission establishes, as a matter 
of 1 aw, that the Atkin firm had no 
property right in the telephone 
number and that Mountain Bell acted 
in compliance with the tariff, for 
valid business reasons, in good 
faith in placing the intercept and 
therefore, Mountain Bell's acts 
cannot serve as a basis for 
liability. • • . • • • • • • • 16 
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D • 
8. 
By failing to grant Mountain Bell's 
Motions to Di3miss the Court allowed 
an impe~missible callateral attack 
o n t he o rd e r o -E t he co mm i s s i on . • • . 
Mountain Bell's actions in pla:=ing 
the inter~ept cannot serve as a 
basis for liability ..•••••• 
I I. THE COUR'r COMMITTED REVERS! Bf..JE SRROR IN 
I'rS ,JORY INSrRUCTIONS IN ?HE ~OLLOWING 
~ESP ECTS: ( 1) IT DIRECTED ·l18E JURY :ro 
FIND A CON'rRACT B8TWEEN ·rHE PARTIES ?OR 
THE TELEPHONE NUMB8R, {2) IT REJ?US8D TO 
INSTRUCT 'riiE JURY AS TO MOUNTAIN BELL'S 
THEORY OF DEFENSE AND ~s TO THE LIMITS o~ 
MOUNTAIN BELL'S GIABILITY AND (3) IT A.LLOWED 
AN IMPERMISSIBLE COLLATER~L ATTACK ON THE 
ORDER OP Tf!S COMMISSION BY i\LLOWING 
1rBE JURY TO MA KE FINDINGS CONTRARY TO 
19 
20 
I'HOSE OP THE COMMISSION. • • • • • 23 
i\ • The Court erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of a con-
tract for the telephone number 
B. The Court erred in refusing to in-
struct the jury as to Mountain Bell's 
theories of defense and as to the 
limits of its liability, while at 
the same time setting forth the 
Atkin firm's theories of 
23 
liability. • • . . • • . • • • . • 25 
The instructions allowed the jury 
to reach conclusions contrary to 
the findings of the Commission and 
were error in that ~hey allowed an 
unlawful collateral attack on the 
Commission order. . •.•• 
III. THE TRI~L COUR·r ERRED IN RSFUSING ·ro 
29 
RULE THAT THE LIABILITY OF MOUNTAIN BELL, 
IF ANY, IN ES'rA.BGISHING AND OPERA.·TING THE 
I NT ER::'. EP TS IS LI MI TED BY 'r A RIFF' • • • 3 4 
IV. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ~NY COM-
E>ETEN 'r E'./ IDE NC E OF LOS s OF 30 sums s 
CAUSED B~ MOUNT~IN 3SLL'S ACTIONS •. 37 
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!\. 
B • 
,.... 
\,,, . 
The htkin firm's claim tor loss of 
business is an impermissible claim 
for attorn2ys' fees 
There was no evidence that any loss 
of business was caused by the actions 
oE Mountain Bell ••.• 
There was no evidence of any loss 
of net income .••.••.•• 
V. TRSRE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR [N THE 
EVIDENCE FOR AH AWARD OP ?UNI'rIVE 
DAMAGES. 
B • 
c. 
Mountain Bell's actions were not 
wrongful .•.•..•••. 
Mountain Bell's actions were not 
willful and malicious 
The Atkin firm suffered no real 
damages .••••• 
SUMM~RY AND CONCLUSION • 
APPENDIX I • • 
l\P PENDI X I I 
37 
39 
42 
44 
14 
45 
47 
47 
50 
51 
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IN THE SUPREME C0UR'I' 
* * * 
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES, 
Char:ered, a Utah Corporation, 
Pl3intif f-Respondent, 
vs. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGR!\PH COMP ANY, et. 
a 1., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OP CASE 
BRIEF OP APPELLAN·r 
Case No . 18 2 3 2 
At k i n , Wr i g ht & M i 1 e s , Ch a rt e red , a 1 a w f i rm ( he re i n -
after referred to as the "Atkin firm"} brought this action 
against The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Mountain Bell") to recover damages 
claimed as resulting from the placement of an intercept on the 
telephone number listed for it in the 1930 Southern Utah Tele-
phone Directory and assiqnment to it of a new telephone num-
ber. ·rhe originally listed telephone number had been mis-
t. a k en l y 1 i st e d i n t h e d i recto r y f o r bot h t h e At k i n E i rm and 
another law firm and the intercept was activated to refer each 
caller to the desired lawyer or law tirm. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
After denying Mountain Bell's motion to dismiss the 
complaint or enter a judgment limiting liability, the District 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Cou r': , .Judge Robert ~ • 
r,..; i t h t he t r i a 1. i\t t he 
owe n s , pr o t em , pres i d i n g , pro c e ea e d 
conclusion of plaintiff's case and at 
the con c 1 us ion of t r i a 1 , the Co u rt denied Mount a i n Be 11 ' s 
motions to dismiss the complaint. The j11ry returned a verdict 
a g a in s t Moun t a i n a e .11 i n t: h e s um o f S2 5 , 0 0 0 • 0 0 comp ens a t o r y 
damages and $30,000.00 punitive damages. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON A?PEAL 
Mountain Bell seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
District Court and dismissal of the complaint or, in the 
alternative, vacation of the judgment and remqnd for retrial of 
those issues which should be properly considered by the 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mountain Bell is a public utility providing telephone 
service in the St. George area of Utah. (R. 1, 10, 81 and 
131). As a regulated public utility, Mountain Bell operates 
pursuant to tariffs reviewed and approved by the Public Service 
Commission of Utah under the governing statutes of the state of 
u t a h . ( Ti t 1 e 5 4 , u t a h Cod e Anno t at ea , 19 5 3 ) • 
As part of its utility function, Mountain sell pub-
lishes annually a telephone directory cont~ining both white and 
yellow page listings. In early October 1980, Mountain sell 
delivered to its customers the Southern Utah I'elephone 
Directory which contains listings for many communities in 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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southern Utah, including St. George (R. 14, Sxhibit 1). As the 
result of a printing error in the directory, the telephone num-
ber of the Atkin firm, 673-4505, was listed in the yellow pages 
not only for the ~tkin firm but also for a competing law firm, 
Allen, Thompson & Hughes. (Exhibit 1, Tr. 75-7 6.) '.\s a conse-
q u enc e , a n yon e- a t t empt in g t o c a 11 A.11 en, Th om p son & Hughes by 
using the yellow page directory would instead reach the Atkin 
firm. (R. 16-18, 21, Ex. 1). Allen, Thompson & Hughes 
vehemently protested the situation to Mountain Bell (Tr. 189, 
198-199, 5:52, 609-6le, 627, 590-692, 595-701, Exhibits 11, 12 
and 24). 
At that time, several tariffs of the Public Service 
Commission of the State of Utah (hereinaEter the "Commission") 
were in effect, which Mountain Bell believed applied to this 
situation. The first, Section 20(N) (1) of the Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company General Exchange Tariff, provided; 
1. The subscriber has no property right in 
the telephone number nor any right to con-
tinuance of service through any particular 
central office, and the Telephone Company 
may change the telephone number or central 
office designation of a subscriber whenever 
it considers it desirable in the conduct of 
its business. (R. 13, Ex. 10) 
In addition, Section '20(8) (3) of the ~'1ount:ain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co~pany General Exchange Tariff provided; 
The Telephone Company's liability arising 
from errors in or omissions of directory 
listings shall be limited to and satisfied 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by a refund not exceeding the amount of the 
charges for such of the customer's service 
as is affected during the period covered by 
the directory in which the error or omission 
occurs. {R,. 71-72, Exhibit 15) 
After thorough investigation of the situation (Tr. 
189-194, 206-209, 274-275, 386-392, 4'.)2-463, 513-615, :)20) I 
considering the governing tariffs and desiring to resolve a 
confusing direct0ry listing problem so as to both assist the 
general calling public and yet be fair to both law firms (Tr. 
182, 189-190, 213, 226, 511-613, '525, 528, 530, 531), Mountain 
Bell determined to place a mechanical • I- t 1 in .. ercep on the 
telephone number listed for both firms and to assign a new num-
ber to the Atkin firm. The intercept was located in the st. 
George central telephone office, answered each call and auto-
matically played a rec~rded message, stating: 
The number you have dialed, 673-4505, is no 
longer in service due to a directory listing 
error. If you are calling Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, the number is 629-2612 or if you are 
calling Allen, Thompson & Hughes, the number 
is 573-4892. This is a :elephone company 
recording. (R. 86, Ex. 14, Tr. 270, 
392-393.) 
On the same day the mechanical intercept went into 
operation, the Atkin firm filed an action in the District Court 
lA mechanical intercept is a device including a tape 
recording, wired into the telephone circuits, which will inter-
cept all incoming calls and play a prerecorded message whenever 
that telephone number is called. (Tr. 243-244.) 
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seeking damages from Mountain Sell and, while not reques~ing it 
in their complaint ( R. 1-2), secured an ex parte t.er.tporary 
restraining order requiring Mountain Bell to remove the inter-
cept and restore the prior telephone number (R. 50). 
Mountain Bell complied with the court order (Tr. 
245-245) so that the mechanical intercet?t operated for only 
about 36 hours (Ex. 24, p. 113) but sought to have the order 
vacated on the ground that the District Court lacked jurisdic-
t i on t o en t e r such a n :> rd e r ( R . 7 - 2 7 ) • Th e t r i a 1 co u r t · ref use d 
to vacate the order (R. 47-48) and thereafter entered the order 
as a preliminary injunction (R. 76-78). Mountain sell then 
petitioned this Court for an extraordinary writ or interlocu-
tory appeal to ·vacate the injunction (R. 52-53), but tha;: 
request was denied. ( R. 171). 
Allen, Thompson & Hughes then filed a petition with 
the Public Service Commission asking that the intercept on 
673-4605 be restored or some other action be taken to correct 
the situation (Exs. 24 and 25, Tr.. 243, 702-703). 
At t he co mm i s s ion hear i ng , Mount a in 3e11 ' s w i t n es s es 
testified that a mechanical intercept located in St. George, 
Utah was preferable to a live operator intercept because the 
mechanical intercept would be located and serviced in st. 
Geor3e and every caller would receive exactly the same message, 
w hi 1 e the 1 i v e ope rat or s w o u 1 d be 1 o cat e d i n Sa 1 t La k e o r 
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Denver. In addition, operator intercepts are mu::::h more diffi-
cult to administer and it is harder to insure consistency in 
the interce?t o~eration because each call is randomly diverted 
to one of a large pool of operators who asks the caller who is 
being called and then, based on the calle·r' s response, gives 
the caller the telephone number of the desired party. (Tr. 
421-424, 430-433, :534-639; Ex. 24, pp. 15-19, 47-51, 55-59, 
7 7 - 7 9 , 8 1-S 2 ) • De sp i t e t hes e war n i n g s , t he At k i n f i rm i n s i st e d 
that if an intercept had to be installed, it must be a live 
operator intercept (Tr. 421-424). 
The C:>mmission found that Section 20(~) (1) was 
applicable, that the proposal to place an intercept "appears to 
be a fair and equitable method of resolving ·the difficuH:ies 
which have resulted from the listing error," and that such a 
"proposal was consistent with both Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company policy and the rules, regulations and 
tariffs approved by this Commission." (R. 13Q, proposed sx-
h i b it 8 ) • Th e n , a cc e d i n g t o t he i\ t k i n f i rm ' s p r e f e r enc e f o r a 
live operator intercept over a mechanical intercept, th2 Com-
mission issued an order directing that Mountain Bell: 
shall place an intercept on the telephone 
number of the law firm of Atkin, Wright & 
Miles which intercept shall be oper-
ated by a live operator who shall request of 
t.he caller with whom the caller wishes to 
speak and then the caller shall be referred 
to the telephone number of the correct 
1 a wy er or 1 aw f i rm w i t h whom t he ca 11 er 
desires to speak. (R. 130-130.l\., Ex. 25.) 
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When the Commission :>rder became final, :1ountain aell 
requested the Diatrict Court to vacate the injunction in ordar 
to allow Mountain Bell to comply with the Commission order, on 
the ground that the two orjers were in conflict and the Commis-
sion order took precedence (R. 107-130A.). The District Court 
refused. (Tr. proceedings January 7, 1981, pp. 35-38). 
After the Commission informed Mount3in Bell of its 
intent to impose sanctions if Mountain Bell failed to comply 
with its order (Ex. 36), Mountain gell petitioned this court to 
determine with which of the two conflicting orders it should 
comply. This Court granted Mountain 3ell's t;>etition on Febru-
ary 17, 1981, and issued an order vacating the injunction of 
the Discrict Court (R. 216, 217-218). On February 27, 1981, 
the live operator intercept Wgs placed in operation (Exhibit 
1 7 , Tr . 4 5 9 ) • The dam a g e act i o n t he n proceeded i n t he d i st r i c t 
court. 
Prior to trial Mountain Bell moved the trial court to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that there could not be a 
valid claim regarding the installation of the intercept when 
that action was authorized by tariff and was in compliance with 
t he s p e c i f i c d i rec t i ve of t he Co mm is s ion. The court den i e d 
this motion (R. 301). Mountain sell also moved t:he court t:o 
enter an order restricting the damages to only those permitted 
by Commission tariffs, that is, to a pro rata return of the fee 
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ch a r g e a f o r t h e s e r vi c e p ro vi de d ( R • 2 5 9-2 7 9 ) • Th a t mot i o n w a s 
also denied (R. 301). 
During the jury trial, the court made various rulings 
regarding the admission of evidence, the motions of the parties 
and the instructions to the jury, many of which, for the rea-
sons hereinafter discussed, were erroneous and prejudicial to 
Mountain Bell. 
The jury returned a verdict against Mountain Bell for 
$25,000.00 compensatory damages and S30,000.00 punitive jamages 
(R. 336). Judgment was entered on this verdict on January 20, 
1982 {R. 340). 
ARG UMS~T 
POINT I 
;s A REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY, MOUNTAIN BELL CANNOT 3E HELD 
f..JIABf.JE IN DAMAGES FOR ACI'IONS CONSISTENT WITH A VALID 'rARIPP OR 
ACTION TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WI TH THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION. 
As a matter of law and public policy, 3. regulated 
public utility should not be liable for actions taken in com-
pliance with and in response to the lawful and proper tariffs 
and o rd e r s o f the Pub 1 i c s e r vi c e Co mm is s i o n , the stat e agency 
charged with regulating the activities of that utility under 
the laws and constitution of the State of Utah. In ?lacement 
of the first (mechanical) intercept, the Commission ruled that 
appellant acted reasonably and properly. In ?lacing the second 
(live operator) intercept, Mountain Bell wa3 followi~g the 
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:Hders of ':he Commission and this Court . Acco c) i ng ly, 
a?pellant was improperly held liable for actions taken in com-
,?liance :>1ith the :Hder of the Utah Public S2rvice Commissio:-1 
and this Cour: must reverse that judgment. 
A. The statutes of this State grant the Put>lic ser-
vice Commission broad powers to regulate utilities, approve 
tariff regulations and issue :>rders .. .such tariff regulations 
and orders have the force and effect of law. 
The Commission is t.he regulatory ajenc y charged by 
statute with regulating the activities and rates of public 
utilities in this state. The Commission has the power and duty 
t. 0: 
supervise and regulate every public utility 
in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of ev2ry such public utility in 
this state, and to do all things, whether 
herein specifically desi9nated or in addi-
tion thereto, which are necessary or conven-
ient in the exercise of such power and jur-
isdiction ••. Utah Code Ann. ) 54-4-1 
(Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). 
It is difficult to conceive of a broader grant of power and 
discretion. See Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) ("[~he Commis-
sion] is necessarily endowed with considerable latitude of dis-
cretion to enable it to accomplish [its] purpose.") ~1oreover, 
by statute, no tariff can go into effect "except af:er thirty 
days' notice to the commission." Utah Code A.nn. ~ 54-3-3 
(1953). The Commission thus reviews and has the f?OWer to sus-
pend such t3riffs and to modify or refuse :o enact any proposed 
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tariffs. Id. 3 54-3-2. The f:Jrm and content of all tariffs 
are thus approved by ~he Commission. 
To carry out its duties, the Commission also has ~road 
power to investigate Id. ~ 54-4-2 and to hold hearL1gs Id. 
:; 54-4-4 (Supp. 1981) not only relating to rates, but also as 
to any other matter within the Commission's jurisdiction. Id. 
§ 54-7-9 (1953). The Commission has been granted authority to 
issue the necessary orders to effect its decisions Id. 
§ 5 4 - 7 -1 o ( am e nae d Ma r c h 2 5 , 2 8 , 19 8 1 ) an d b o t h t a r i f f s and 
orders have the force and effect of law: 
Every 9ublic utility shall obey and 
comply with each and every requirement of 
every order, decision, direction, rule or 
regulation made or prascri~ed by the commis-
sion in the matters herein specified, or in 
any other matter in any way relating to or 
affecting its business as a ?Ublic utility, 
and shall do everything necessary or proper 
in order to secure compliance with and 
observance oE every such order, decision, 
direction, rule or regulation by all of its 
officers, agents and employees. Id. 
§ 54-3-23 ( 1953) (emphasis added). 
B. As tariffs are the law, the trial court erred in 
refusing to hold that because of lawful tariffs the Atkin E1rm 
did not have a property right in the tele9hone number assigned 
to it and that Mountain Bell could lawfully change the number 
without liabil1ty. 
It is axiomatic that properly approved tariffs are not 
only binding upon the utility and its custom~rs, but. 3.re the 
law. The cases are legion that hold that "(a] tariff . . is 
more than a mere contract -- 'it is the Law'." Shehi v. South-
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west e r n B e 11 ·r e 1 e p h on e co . , 3 :3 2 F . 2 d 5 2 7 , S 2 9 n . 2 ( 1 o t h c i r • 
196 7 ) ( em p h a s i s s Uf?? 1 i e d by t h e C :n r t ) ; _\ c co rd , ca r: e c v . \me r -
ican Teleohone and Telegraph Co., 36S F.2d -B6, ~96 (S~h Cir. 
195 6 ) ; Ame r i ca n Te 1 e p ho n e & Te 1 e CJ r a p h Co • v • P 1 o r i d a- Te :< a s 
?ceight, Inc., 357 F.Supp. 977, 979 (S.u. Fla.), aEf'd per 
curiam, 185 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1973); First Central Service 
Corp. v. 
(Ct . \!?P • 
Mountain Bell Telephone, 95 N.M. 509, 623 P.2d 1023 
1981). The same princi;>le -- that tariffs are :he 
law -- is one applied to all regulated industries. see, e.g., 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers & Co., 256 u.s. 
5 5 6 ( 1 9 2 1 ) ; 3 row n & Root , Inc • v • Ml V Pe i s a n de r , 5 1 8 P • 2 d 4 15 
(5th Cir. 1981); North American Phillips Corp. v. Smery Air 
Fr e i g ht : o rp • , 5 7 9 F • 2 d 2 2 9 ( 2 d c i r. 1 9 7 8 ) ; c i t y M es s e n g e r s e r -
vice of Hollywood, Inc. v. Capitol Records Distributing Coro., 
H5 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972); 
Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 
1972), aEf'd !?er curiam, 477 2.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973). Because 
::hey have the force and effect of law, tariffs are binding on 
customers of the utility "whether the customer actually knows 
of the regulation or not." Essex County Welfare Bd. v. New 
Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 125 N.J. super. 417, 315 A.2d 40, 42 
(1974); see warner v. southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 s.w. 
2d 595, 601 (Mo. 1968); 2irst: 2entral Servi::e Coro., 523 ?.2d 
at 1025. such tariffs ap?lY whether the customer "has specifi-
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cally agreed to them or not." Clarke v. Genenl releehone Co. 
of southeast, 268 s.c. 97, 232 S.3.2d 2-J, 28 (1977). 
rtl i t h t he s e p r i n c i p 1 e s i n mi n d , t h e f o 11 o ·w i n g u n j i 3 -
puted facts compel the conclusion that the :rial court erred i~ 
its rulings on this question. 
1. Section 20(N)(l), the basis for Mountain Bell's 
actions in this case (a tariff duly approved by the Commis-
sion), states: 
The subscriber has no ptoperty right in the 
t e 1 e p hon e numb c r no r a n y r i g ht t o cont i n u-
a n c e of service throu.gh any par':icular cen-
t ra 1 off ice, and the Telephone Com:;> any may 
ch an g e the telephone n umber o r cent r a 1 
office designation of a subscriber whenever 
it considers it desirable in the conduct of 
its business. 
2. ~he Commission, in the hearing on the petition of 
Allen, Thompson & Hughes, found that Section 20(~0 ( 1) of 
Mountain Bell's tariffs was applicable, that Mountain 
Bell's proposal to place an intercept "appears to be a fair 
and equitable method of resolving the difficulties which 
have resulted from the listing error," and that such a 
"proposal was consistent with both Mountain States ·Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company policy and the rules, regula-
tions and tariffs approved by this Cammi ss ion." 
( R. 12 9-13 0 .\) • The A~kin firm did not challenge that 
ruling by seeking rehearing or an appeal. 
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1. In Mountain Bell's petition Eor extraordinary 
r~lief, this Court determined that the orjer of the 2ommis-
sion prevailed over che injunctive order of :he District 
Court ( R. 2 16, 21 7 - 218) • 
The Commission's approval 
entirely consistent with one of its 
oE Section 
vested powers. 
20(N)(l) is 
This Court 
has held that the Commission "'is vested with the power to 
determine the relative rights and obligations between the 
utility and the consumer.'" North Salt Lake v. st. Joseph 
Water & Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 500, 223 P.2d 577, 582 
( 19 50 ) • The Commission's approval of Section 20(N)(l) is 
merely one instance where the C::>mmission has reasonably exer-
cised its vested power. 
'Thus, as established by the Commission's original 
a p ~nova 1 o f sect i o n 2 0 ( N ) ( 1 ) , by t h e Co mm i s s i o n ' s o rd e r an d by 
this court's ruling on Mountain Bell's petition for extraor-
dinary relief, section 20(N) ( 1) of the tariffs is the law; it 
therefore gives Mountain Bell the discretion to change a tele-
phone number assigned to a customer whenever the demands of the 
business make such a change desirable. When the same telephone 
number is listed for two parties, Mountain Bell has only two 
realistic choices: maintain the status quo or assign a new 
number and int~r::ept the listed number. The interests of the 
public and of the party whose number is not listed demand the 
intercept procedure. 
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~s established wi~hout dispu~e at the Commission hear-
ing and at trial, that is the normal, accet;>ted procedure in 
such circumstances because it: allows each affec~ed ,?~rty to 
r e c e i v e t he c a 11 s i n t ended f o r i t a n d t: h us f a c i l i t at es t: e 1 e-
phone commun icat ion by the genera 1 :?Ubl ic. This a~proach is 
entirely consistent with the tariff and enables Mountain Bell 
to meet its duty as a public utility to provide "just" and 
"reasonable" service to all its customers. Utah Code Ann. 
) 54-3-1 (1953) (Supp. 1981). 
Tariffs similar or identical to Section 20(N)(l) have 
been upheld as reasona'.::>le in all cases that have considered 
them. For example, in Shehi v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., the court, in construing a tariff virtually 
identical to Section 20(N) ( 1), stated: 
The tariff provision negatives an1 €laim of 
a cu st o rn e r t o a prop e rt y r i g ht i n a t e 1 e-
p hone number but cannot be construed to 
authorize the telephone company to exercise 
arbitrary dominion over the number so as to 
cause harm and injury. 382 B'.2d at 630. 
The court thus affirmed the validity of the tariff and the 
general principle that the customer has no property righ~ i~ a 
telephone number, at the same time imposing a good fai:h 
requirement on the part of the utility not to "exarcise arbi-
trary dominion~ over the telephone number. 
The co u rt in Pr i c e v. Sou t h Cent r a 1 a e 11 , ·2 9 1 U a . 
144, 313 So.2d 184 ( 1975) reached essent:i3lly the same con-
clusion: 
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'i~e would a]ree that a cus:omer has no ?ro-
perty ri~ht, as such, in a number and that. 
the tele9hone company may change its numbers 
whenever, in good faith, it considers that 
t hi s i s n e c es s a ry • Id • a t 13 8 • ( Sm p has i s 
supplied by the court~ 
several other courts have also upheld the validity of similar 
or identical tariffs. Rothman v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph 
Co • , ( I n r e Best Re-Ma nu fact u r:i n g Co • ) , 4 5 3 F • 2 d 8 4 8 ( 9 t h c i r . 
1971); Slenderella Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Telef?hone & I'ele-
graph Co., 286 J?.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961): Freedom Finance Co. v. 
New York Teleehone Co., 29 A..D.2d 545, 285 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1967); 
In re Goldman, 50 Misc. 2d 309, 270 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1966); In r2 
M.R. Glass, Inc., 48 ~isc. 2d 21, 254 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1955). 
Thus, when a telephone company changes a telephone 
number for a valid business reason, the tariff compels the con-
clusion that since no property right has been invaded or 
injurea; no liability should result Erom the telephone number 
change. The Court, therefor2, erred in failing to hold that 
Mountain aell's acts, which w,ere authorized by and consistent 
with the lawfully published tariff, do not constitute a basis 
for liability. See Occhino v. Northwestern aell Telephone Co., 
575 F.2d 220, 227-228 (3th Cir. 1982). 
Mountain Bell, seeking to have the trial court a9ply 
these priaciples, moved the court prior to trial ( R. 259-79), 
at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence (Tr. 594-598, 
599-504) and at the con·;:lusion of the taking of evidence (Tr. 
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776-777) to dismiss the complaint oE the 9laintiff as to all 
claims accruing from acts taken in compliance with the tariffs 
and orders of the C:)mmission. Despite the ·::itation of :1ountain 
a e 11 ' s a u t ho r i t i es a n d re c i tat i on o E t hi s point ( 'Tr • 6 0 3 -6 0 4 ) , 
the trial court denied the motions but granted a continuing 
objection to all evidence of alleged consequences of the inter-
cept.s and number change during :he course of trial (Tr. 4-7, 
113-115). Furthermore, the pleadings contained no reference to 
the second interce?t or any resulting dama 1jes (R. 81-92); 
neve rt he less, the court admitted such e vi de nee over an ob jec-
:ion that it was not within the sco9e of ::he ;;>leadings {Tr. 
510-513). That ruling is reversible error. Castagna "· Nyman, 
un?ublished decision no. 16905 (Utah, issued Sept. 24, 1930). 
c. The Order of the Public Service Commission estab-
lishes, as 3 matter of law, that the \tkin firm had no ?ropertv 
right in the telephone number and that Mountain aell ac~ed in 
com;;>liance with the tariff, for valid business reasons, in good 
faith, in ?lacing the interce?t and chereeore, Mount3in 3ell's 
acts cannot serve as a basis for liability. 
After an extensive hearing in which the A:::kin firm, 
the ~llen firm and Mountain Bell partici9ated, the Commission 
issued an order dated December 9, 1980. (R. 129-130A.). After 
concluding that it had jurisdiction, the Commission de:er;-nined 
that under Section 20(~n ( 1) "the telephone c:)m~Jany retains all 
rights in and to telephone numbers and no customer obtains any 
pr ope rt y ri')ht in a telephone number. n (R. 129-130A). Based 
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upon uncontroverted evidence ~hat when two customers are lis~ed 
'•I i th the s am e numb e r , p 1 ace men t of a n i n t e r c e pt i s t he pro c e-
dure regularly followed by ~ountain Sell to resolve the prob-
lems that result from that kind of error (I1r. 17, 18, 46), :he 
Commission found thac: 
The telephone company pc>posal to place an 
intercept: appears to be a Eair and 
equitable method of resolving the difficul-
ties which have resulted from :.he listing 
error. It is consistent with both Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Com;? any 
policy and rules, regulations and tariffs 
approved by this Commission." (R. 130.) 
Based on these findings, the Commission ordered Mountain Bell 
to place an operator intercept. The ·Jrde r became f ina 1 on 
December 29, 1980. No petition for rehearing was filed by any 
party nor was the matter appealed to this Court. 
If there were any questions as to the validity and 
meaning of Sect.ion 20(N) ( 1), or as to the nature and pur;_:>ose of 
Mountain Bell's actions, the Commission findings lay them to 
rest. The Commission reaffirmed its ap?roval of the tariff and 
specifically concluded that it means precisely what it says --
that the ~tkin firm had no property right in a telephone num-
be r • More o v e r, t he co mm i s s ion f o u n d t hat Mount. a in Be 11 ' s a c-
tion and pur?ose ware consistent with :he t3riff. 
The Eindings and orJers of the Commission have the 
force and effect of law, when such findings 3.nd ::>rder3 are 
within i:s jurisdiction. see Gilmer v. Public Utilities 
-17-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission, 67 Utah 222, 247 ?. 284, 290 (1926) ( "[W]here its 
oders are within its juri.sdict:ion and the bounds oE reason, 
and are not capricious and arbitr3ry, this court cannot int2r-
fere. 11 ). Thus, if the Atkin firm thought that. the Commission's 
Order was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, it could have 
exercised its statutory right of review of the Order, first by 
the Commission, Utah Code Ann.~ 54-7-15 (1953) (a,nended Mar. 
25, 1981), and then by this Court, id. § 54-7-15 (1953). This 
. it failed to do. Moreover, this Court itself collaterally 
affirmed the Commission's Order in Mountain Bell's pe~ition for 
extraordinary relief in which the Atkin firm partici9ated 
? fully.· 
2The reasons for this Court's decision :o give effect to 
the Commission order are obvious: 
( I ) t m us t b e r ea 1 i zed t hat t he 1 e g i s 1 a t u re h as g i ve n 
the Commission the responsibility for ~he overall 
planning and regulation of cer:ain public services 
. . . . a e ca Ll s e t ha t i s t he p u rp o s e f o r ,..., h i c h t he 
Commission was established and functions, it is 
assumed to have s~ecialized knowledge and ex?ertise in 
that field. Consequently it: is accorjed comparatively 
broad pr2ro9atives in carrying on investiJations and 
making determinations in the dischar,3e of its duties. 
For these reasons its findings and orders are endowed 
with the pr~sumptions of verity; and upon appeal to 
this court we assume that t:he Commission 8elieved 
t hose a s p e ct s o f t he e vi a enc e w hi ch s up po r: i ts f ind-
ings and we review the rec~rd in the light most favor-
able to them. Armored Motors serv. v. Public Ser. 
co mm i s s ion , 2 3 u t ah 2 a 4 2 2 , 4 6 4 P • 2 d 5 8 2 , 5 8 4 ( 1 9 7 O ) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Thus, the C~)ffimission Order establishes as a mat~~r of 
law that the ~tkin firm had no right in the telephone number 
and that Mountain 13ell's change oE the number and pla=ement of 
:he inter~ept were reasonable and done in good faith for a 
legitimate business purpose. 
D. By failing to grant Mountai:-i Bell's 
Dismiss, the Trial Court allow.ea an imper;nissible 
attack on the order of the Commission. 
Motion to 
collateral 
Because of its broad legislative grant of aut:.hority 
a n d i t s e x pe r '.: i s e i n r e g u 1 at in g u t i li t i es, t he Co mm is s ion h as 
broad discretion. Armored Motors Service, supra; Utah Gas sec-
vice Co. v. Mountain Fuel SUpfllY Co., 442 P.2d 530 ( Uta'.:1 
1967). By statute, orders and decisions of the Commission are 
immune from collateral attack: 
In all collateral actions or proceedings the 
orders and decisions of the commission which 
have become final shall be conclusive. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-14 
For collateral estoppel to be effective the specific point or 
issue must have been one that was actually litigated in the 
prior case, .James Talcott, Inc. v. ~llahabad Sank, Ltdq 444 
F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1971), and was necessary to the de-:ision. 
Ing a 11 s I r o n work s co • v • F e h l ha be r Co rp • , 3 2 7 F • S up p . 2 7 2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
In t he hear in g b e for~ t he Co mm i s s i on, t w o u 1 t i mate 
issues were raised: ( 1) Is Sect:: ion 20(N) ( 1) a reason3~l2 
tariff provision and (2) Is a number chan1e coupled with an 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intercept and reasona~le and consistent with Section 
20(N)(l)? All parties, including the Atkin 1:irtn, par;:icipated 
and presented testimony. Thereafter, the Commission con~luded 
that section 20(~)(1) was reasonable and that an intercept pr~-
cedure was fair and equitable and consistent with Section 
20(N)(l). Both findings are a necessary predicate to the Com-
~ission's Order ~hat Mountain Bell ?lace an int~rcept. 
As t o t hose t wo i mp o rt ant i s sues :: hen, t he : o mm i s s ion 
'Jrder is con·~lusive and any action contrary t~ :he Commission 
findings constitutes a collateral attack on the order which is 
invalid under Section 54-7-14. 
The trial court's refusal to grant Mount.a in Bell's 
motions to dismiss, which were premised on the validity of sec-
t ion 2 0 ( N ) ( l ) a n d t he r ea son ab 1 e n e s s o f Yl o u n t a i n 3 e 11 ' s a c-
tions, constitutes reversible error. This .error is exacerbated 
by the trial court's submission to the jury of the issues con-
elusively determined by the Commission. See, e.g., Pacific 
Teleohone & Telegraf?h Co. v. Superior Court, SO Cal. 2d 425, 
3 8 5 P • 2d 2 3 3, 3 4 ca 1. Rpt r. 573 (1933); north Salt Lake v • ........ ::> L. • 
Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., supra, 223 P.2d at 585 ("A 
finding of the Public Service C~mmissi8n on a disputed qu2stion 
of fact cannot be collaterally attacked by a jury finding con-
• • 11 3 trar1w1se. ) 
3These issues ,3re discussed fully in Point tI, inEra. 
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E. Mountain 3ell's actians in ?lacin-1 the inter-:ept 
cannot serve as a basis Ear liability. 
In acting consis:ently with its filed ':ariEfs and in 
following the Order of the Public Service Commission, Mountain 
sell was com~lying ~ith the law of the State of Utah. Jnder 
such circumstances, as a matter of law and public policy, the 
utility should not be held liable for :hose actions of campli-
ance with the law. 
I n S o k o l v. Pu b l i c U t i 1 i t i e s C: o mm i s s i on , 6 5 . ca 1. 2 d 
2 4 7 , 4 18 P • 2 d 2 5 5 , 5 1 Ca 1 • ~ p t r • 5 7 3 ( 19 5 5 ) , t: h e u t. i 1 i t y 
followed an express order of t.he Commissian. The court there 
held that "' [i ]t would be manifestly unfair to impose civil 
liability upon the private person for doing that which the law 
requires.'" Id. at 272; cf. Occhino v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 675 ~.2d 22J, 227-228 (8th Cir. 1982). See 
also, Markel v. Transamerica 'ri-:le Insurance Co., 103 Ariz. 
353, 442 P.2d 97, 106 (1968); cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968): 
How~ver, the general theory of the early 
cases was that there could be no successful 
claim sounding in tort Eor an act required 
by a judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction. This is as it should be. No one 
ought to be placed in a position where he 
must risk a suit for damages if he obe1s or 
contempt of court if he fails to obey, a 
1 a wf u 1 o rd e r o f t he co u rt • Id . 
The same principles apply to the instant matter. 
The Co u rt t: h u s e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o co n c 1 u d e ~ hat , by 
virtue of the Order of the Commission, the Atkin firm failed to 
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state a c~use of action as a result: oe t::he number c:.B.nge and 
intercept. The Court:'s error goes ~o e::i.ch oE the theories 
ultimately presented to the jury: ( 1) oreach of con1:ract, (2) 
negligence, (3) willful and wanton conduct, and (4) intentional 
interference with business relationships (R. 
no pr ope r: y r i g ht i n t he t e 1 ep hone n umber 
company has the reasonable right to change 
3H). IE there is 
and the telephone 
a c us:. om e r ' s t: 2 1 e-
phone number where the demands oE the business so require, each 
of the legal theories falls by its own weight. Where no pro-
perty interest exists, there can be no duty breached in rela-
tion thereto. See J. Heyer & Co. v. Illinois sell Telephone 
Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 53, 409 N.F.::.2d 557, 559 (1980) ("It has 
been established that the source of any duty of [a utility] to 
i~s subscribers is only in the tariff as filed.") Furt.her;nore, 
even assuming a duty, the Commission order conclusively es:ab-
lishes that Mountain Bell's actions were in good faith and rea-
sonable, thus negating any claim for willful conduct., inten-
tional interference with business r2l:ttionships or breach of 
contract. 
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POOH II 
THE cou::tr COMMI·rTEu R8VERSIBLS ERROR IN r·rs JURf INSI1 RUCrIONS 
tN I'HE 8'0LLOWING RESPECTS: ( 1) IT DIRECTED THE JURY ro PIND A 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR THE TELEPf-IQNE NUMB8R; (2) Ir 
RE?:JSED TO I~S'I'RUCT THE JORY AS ro r10UNTAtN SELL' s :rn.~ORY OF 
DEFENSE AND AS TO THE LIMITS OP MOUNTAIN BSLL'S LIABILITY; \ND 
(3) IT \LLOWED .i\.N IMP8RMISSIBLE COLLA'I'ERAL ATTACK ON I'HE ORD8R 
OF THE COMMISSION BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO M.~KE !?IND[NGS CON-
·rRARY TO THOSE OF TqE COMMISSION. 
The fundamental err:ors made by t:he Court in refusing 
to rule Eor Mountain Bell as a matter of law were carried into 
t he j u ry i n st: r u ct i on s , w he re t he Co u rt m i s st at e d t he 1 aw, f a i 1-
ed to state applicable law and reEused to ?resent Mountain 
aell's defenses. As a result, Mountain Bell was seriously 
prejudiced. Thus, aven if it we re prop a r Eo c t.he Court to have 
denied Mountain Bell's motions to dismiss, the judgment must be 
reversed and remanded because of the serious ana prejudicial 
errors in the jury instructions. 
A. The Court erred in instructing the jury as to the 
existence of a contract for the telephone number. 
The first major error in :he jury instructions relates 
to whether a contract existed between the parties for a tele-
t;>hone number. over t:he objection Of Mountain 
(Tr. 777-779), the Court gave Instruction 5E: 
When a telephone number is assigned to a 
3 u b s c r i be r a n d i t: i s a cc e f> t e d by : he s u b-
s c r i be r , a cont. r a c t i s created by t he t e 1 e-
p hone company and the subscriber. (R. 318). 
Bell 
The errors in that instruc:ion are fur~her exacerbated 
by Instruction 5~: 
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In ;:,rder to find t:hat a contract:, eU:her 
written or onl, existed between the plain-
tiff and the defendant concerning ~he use of 
the telephone numbers 573-4505, 573-4506, 
573-1507 and 573-4508, you must find :hat 
the defendant offered to let plaintiff use 
those numbers in consideration of a monthly 
fee and that the plaint.iff accepted that 
offer and agreed to r;>ay, in e;{chang~ there-
for2, a monthly fee for the use of those 
telephone numbers. (R. 319.) 
Taken together, these instructions are nothing less than the 
Court's direction to the jury to find that a contract existed 
between Mountain Bell and the Atkin firm for the telephone nu~ 
bers from the moment service was established. 
Not only wa3 there no evidence of an orJl or written 
contract for the specific telephone numbers upon which to base 
such instructions, but the instructions completely misstate ~he 
1 a w. sect ion 2 0 ( N ) ( 1 ) o f t he C'J mm is s i o n t 3 r i E f s i s t he 1 a w; i t 
clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously states that a cus:omer 
gains no ;;>roperty right:, contractual or otherwise, to a tele-
phone number. 
If the relationship between Mountain Bell and its sub-
scriber is charact2rized as contractual, chen the tariff co~-
tains the terms of the contract, which cannot be varied by ~he 
pa rt i es. Shehi v. southwestern sell Telephone Co., 382 F .2d 
527, "529 n.2 (10th Cir. 1967); ~ Car:er v. American Teleph.Jne 
and Telegraph Co., 355 i?.2d 485 {5th Cir. 19'55); ?irst Cent.ol 
s e r v i c e Co rp • v. M o u n t a in B e 11 T e 1 e p h one , 9 5 N • M • 5 0 9 , 5 2 3 ? • 2 d 
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10 2 3 ( c ': . \pp • 19 81) • I t i s ':) i n d i n g o n ': he s u b a c r i 0 e .c s , 
including the plaintiff, whether they :<now that the tariff 
exists or not. First Central Service C'.)ro. v. Moun~ain Bell 
Teleohone, id. at 1025; Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co., 428 s .w .2d 596, 601 (Mo. 1968); Essex County Welfare Board 
v . New .J e r s e y B e 1 1 Te 1 e p ho 11 e Co . , 12 6 N • ,J • s up e r . 41 7 , 3 15 A • 2 d 
40, 42 (1974). 
Finally, it is a firmly established principle in pub-
lie utility law that ~the source of any duty of [a utility] to 
i ts s u b s c r i be r s i s o n 1 y t he t a ri f f a s f il e d • " J • M eye r & co . 
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 409 N .E.2d at 559. (Emphasis 
added.) The tariff, as filed, is directly contrary to the jury 
instructi0ns. By thus directing the jury ~o find 3 contract, 
the Court committed reversi~le error. 
B • The Co u r t e r re d i n re f us i n g t o i n s t r u c t t he j u r y 
as to Mountain Bell's theories of defense and as to the limits 
of its liability, while at the same time setting forth the 
Atkin firm's theories of liability. 
It: is fundamental that the parties in a tri.:~l are 
entitled to have the jury instructed not only as to the 
theories of liability but also as to the theories of defense, 
:lS lon~ as those theories ara suppor~ed by some evidence in the 
re co rd. In Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, HO ?.2d 772, 773 
(1943), this Cour: stated: 
-25-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant is entitled to have his 
m i t t e d t o t he j u ry o n a n y ~ he o r f 
by ?roper evidence • 
case sub-
j ust if ied 
Each party is entitled to have his 
theory of the case f)resent:ed in such a way 
as to aid the jury and not confuse it. 
See also, Startin_ v. Madsen, 120 Utah :531, 237 P.2d 834, 836 
(1951); Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549, 155 P. 432 {1916). 
Mountain Bell's primary defense was that by tariff it 
had the right to change the telephone number, that all its 
actions were consistent with that tariff and, even more impor-
tantly, were e:q_:>ressly sanctioned and ordered b'/ the Pu'.:>lic 
Service Commission. Another important as~ect of Mountain 
sell' s case was that its liability was limited 'of tariff. In 
several proposed instructions submitted by Mountain aell (Mo~n-
tain Bell Inst. 12-15 and Mountain Bell Replacement Ins~. 
12-15), a balanced approach to the competing theori~s of :he 
pa rt i e s w a s p re s e n t e d f o r t h e j u r y t o cons i de r • 4 Th e Co u rt 
then deleted from these instructions Mountain 3ell's theory of 
its defense. 
A prime example of the crucial differences between 
Mountain sell' s proposed instructions and what was ultimat2ly 
given by the Court is illustrated by the following. The entire 
quotation that follows is Mountain Bell's proposed Instruction 
4The Court lined out, cut and pasted the 
instructions so no complete state~ent of either 
respondent's requested jury instructions a:: 
record. (R. 315-334). 
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:e 
15. In its Instruction SA., the t.ri3.l court. ,3ave t:he first: 
paragraph verbatim but completely deleted the second parag:3ph 
(underlined). 
The plaintiff has asserted four claims 
against the defendant. Before you can 
return a verdict for the plaintiff on any of 
them you must find from a ~nc:oonderance of 
the evidence that the claims which the court 
will describe for you are true. These 
claims are: 1. That the defendant by 
placement of an intercept upon its phone and 
changing its phone number br~ached its con-
tract with the plaintiff. 2. That the 
defendant was negligent in the prepara:ion 
of its phone book and that negligence proxi-
mately caused damage to the plaintiff. 3. 
That defendant injured the plaintiff by 
willful and wanton actions against the 
? 1 a i n t i f f s ca us i n g t he m i n j u r y • 4 • Th a t 
the defendant willfully and intentionally 
interfered with business relationships of 
the plaintiffs and their clients. If you 
find that any of the propositions as they 
were thus described to you are true and cor-
rect, you 3hould determine the dama1es sus-
tained by the plaintiffs according to the 
instructions hereinaEter given to you on 
that subject, but if you find against them, 
you should so return a verdict of no cause 
of action against the plaintiff in accor3-
ance with the instructions that are her~in­
a f t e r g i ve n t o you. 
The def end ant: asserts that: a 11 act ions 
taken were lawful and proper and reasonable 
u n de r the ta r i E E s and o r a e ~ s of t he Pub 1 i c 
service Cammission as such orders and 
tariffs are the governing la'>1 of the State 
of Utah and the defendant must comely with 
those laws in all its actions. The deEend-
ant also asserts that if it was negligent or 
if defendant breached its contract with 
plaintiEf, the olaintiff is entitled to 
recover no more than a pro rata share of the 
charges for such service. If you find that 
-27-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this is true or that the olaintiEf suff3red 
no damage as a result of anv act of the 
defendant, then you shall return a verdict 
in favor of t.he defendant. (R. 314.) 
The obvious effect of the instruction was that the plaintiff's 
theories of liability wer2 pr2sented to the jury while :he jury 
was left completely in the dark as to Mountain Bell's defenses. 
This problem was not isolated to Instruction 5A, but 
was repeated in Instructions SB (R. 315), SC, (R. 315) and 5D 
(R. 317). In each of those in3tructions the Court advised the 
jury of the plaintiff's liability theory but deleted all refer-
ence t.o the defenses of Mountain Bell. Mountain Bell's pro-
f? o s e d Inst r u ct i o n 14 re a d a s f o 11 ow s , bu t t he Co u r : i n g i vi n g 
Instruction SB, deleted the underlined language: 
The plaintiff complains that defendant has 
intentionally interfered with its business 
relationshir_:>s. 'I'he defendant asserts that 
its action was taken pursuant to the lawful 
order of the Public Service Commission of 
the State of Utah and the tariffs filed with 
the Pub l i c s e r vi c e Co mm i s s i. on by w hi ch ~ h 2 
conduct of the defendant is regulated. 
For the f>laintiff to recover, you must 
find that the defendant has intentionally 
acted to interfere with the business rela-
tionships of the plaintiff, intendin3 to 
interfere with those relationships, acting 
in a willful and wanton manner to i~jure the 
plaintiff. If you find that the defendant. 
has done so and such acts have proximately 
caused injury to the ?laintiff, you shall 
return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
but if you find the defendant ha3 not done 
so but has, in fact, acted lawfull? in 
accordance with the orders of the Public 
Service Commission or did not intend bv its 
-28-
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actions tJ interfere with the business rela-
tionshii?S of the '.)laintiEE, then you 3hal 1 
find in favor of the defendant and against 
the i?laintiff as to this claim. (R. 315.) 
s i mi 1 a r de 1 et ion s o c cu r re d e 1 sew he r e w i t h t h e re s u l t t ha t n o-
where in the inst.ructions does the Court advise the jury of 
Mountain Bell's defense. 
In Instruction 5G (R. 320) the Court apparently made 
vague reference to Section 20 (G) (5) of the Mountain Bell 
tariffs and stated that " [ t] a riffs a re rules and regulations 
with which the defendant must com~ly," but did not instruct the 
jury, as it should have done, that the tariff is equally 
applicable to the customer. 
In Instruction 5H (R. 321), the Court referred to sec-
tion 20(~) (1) of the tariffs but failed to advise the jury that 
Mountain Bell's action in placing the intercept was pursuant to 
t he 0 rd e r o f the Co mm is s i o n • In fact, the only reference t.o 
the Commission Order in all the instructions tot.he jury is 
cont a i n e d i n In st r u ct i o n 5 1 ( R • 3 2 2 ) w he r e t he Co u r t d i rec t e d 
the jury that compliance with a commissi::>n order does not 
excuse it from liability. Thac instruction was both an incor-
rect statement of the law and a directive to the jurf that 
Mountain sell had no valid defense to plaintiff's claim. 
In thus deleting Mountain Bell's defenses from the 
instructions, the trial court severely violated Mountain Bell's 
right to a fair trial by prejudicing and misdirecting the jury: 
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It is well settled that instructions pur-
porting to contain the conditions nece3sary 
to a verdict Eoc one party must contai0 all 
of those conditions and not overlook 
defenses on which substantial eviJence lHs 
been introduced. Jordan v. Gr2at Western 
Mot o r way s , 2 13 ca 1 • 5 o 6 , 2 ? • 2 d 7 g 6 , 7 3 7 
(1931) .. 
This is precisely what the Court did. It deleted in total 
Mountain Bell's theory of defense and at the same time empha-
sized over and over again the Atkin firm's theories of liabil-
ity. Mountain 3ell objected in vain to these prejudicial 
actions which constitute reversible error. (Tr. 777-779). 
, c. The instructions allowed the jury to reach conclu-
sions contrary to the findin3s oE the C~mmission and were error 
in that they allowed an unlawful collateral attack on the Com-
mission Jrder. 
In its Order, the Commission reaffirmed t.l}e validity 
of Section 20(N) ( 1), found that the intercept proposed by 
Mountain Bell was "just and equitable" and found Mountain 
Bell's actions to be consistent with the rules and tariffs of 
t he Co mm i s s i on ( R • 1 2 9 -1 3 O A ) • Several of the instructions 
allowed the jury to reach conclusions contrary to those find-
ings. F'or example, Instruction SD (R. 317) allowed the jury to 
find that Mountain Bell intentionally injured ?laintiff in 
changing plaintiff's t:eleph~ne number, a findin~ completely 
contrary to the finding of the Commission that ~ountain Bell's 
actions were proper and taken pursuant to tariff, ~s a matter 
of 1 a w, t: he Co mm i s s i o n ' s ·J rd e r p rec 1 u de s a E i n d i n g o f t: h e 
intent necessary to commit the tort described in Instruction SJ. 
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Instruc:iona SE (R. 31'3) and 5!?' (R. 319) direct the 
jury to find that a contract existed between the parties Eor 
the telephone number, which is directly contrary to ~he 
Commission's finding that customers have no property right, by 
contract or otherwise, in a telephone number. 
In Instruction SH (R. 321), the court stated that the 
telephone company cannot arbitrarily or in bad faith change a 
telephone number.. While that pr:inciple is true generally, it 
did not apply in this case ~ecause the Commission had already 
found that the intercept was "a fair and equitable" me:lns of 
solving the directory listing problem. The mere submission of 
that instruction allowed the jury to find that Mountain Bell 
had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith, contrary to the 
Commission finding. 
The ultimate irony was that the trial court not only 
allowed the jury to make findings contrary to the Order, but it 
re fused t o a 11 ow t he E u 11 Co mm i s s ion or d er i n t o e vi den c e , ( Tr • 
134-44) the ;round for that refusal being that the findings 
involve "the issue in this case." (Tr. 440) The trial court 
characterized the findings of the Commission as "no more than a 
crystalization of certain port.ions of the evidence" (Tr. 437) 
and stated that he was "not concerned with what went on in the 
m i n a s o f t: he ? u ~ l i c s e r vi c e co mm i s s i o n e r s" ( Tc • 4 41 ) , t: hat " t he 
findings of an administrative body are not things a jury should 
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consider" (Tr. 433) and that they were no more binding on t:he 
t:rial cour: than those of the "Gunlock City Cou;-icil" ("rr. 
44 2) • such statements indicate that the Court completely 
ignored the legislative pronouncement that "[t]he findings and 
conclusions oE the commission on questions of Eact shall be 
final and shall not be subject to review. 1' Utah Code Ann. 
) 54-7-16. The Court thus clearly recognized that the issues 
being presented to the jury were the same ones previously ruled 
upon by the Commission. Yet the jury was allowed to see only 
the portion of the order that directed Mountain aell to place 
the intercept. The court deleted the entire findin-Js of the 
Commission (proposed Ex. 8, Ex. 25). 
In allowing the jury to contradict the findings of the 
Commission, the trial court committed reversible err:)r. Under 
Section 54-7-14, "[i]n all collateral actions or proceediWJS 
the orders and decisions of the commission which have become 
final shall be conclusive." In North Salt Lake v. st. Joseoh 
Water & Irr:igation Co., 18 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950), one 
of the parties attempted to have the district cour: make find-
i n g s cont r a r y t o a n e a r 1 i e r d e c i s i on o f t he co TILi'l i s s i on. In 
ruling that the earlier Commission order prevailed, this Court 
stated: 
It is 
called 
trary 
body. 
not the function oE a jury to be 
upon to find in support of or can-
to a finding of an administrative 
A. finding of t:he Public servic~ Com-
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mission on a disouted quest~~n of fact 
cannot be coll3t:erally attacked by having a 
jury find contrariwise. 223 ?.2d at 585 
(emphasis added). 
This is pr~cisely what the trial court in this ca32 allowed to 
happen. The Court in North Salt f..iake described the ?rocedure 
that should have been followed: 
1 f [defendant:] claimed an impairment of 
their rights by the rulings made and were 
not satisfied with the order as entered, 
then their r~lief was by requesting a 
further hearing bef'.)re :he Public .service 
Commission or by a9peal to this court. Not 
having t:aken steps to have the ::>rder mocrr= 
fied or changed, the same has the effect of 
a judgment and its le9alit:y cannot be 
attacked in this 9roceedin9s [sic]. Id. at 
583 (emphasis added). -
The Atkin firm part:icipated in the Commission hearing, 
but neither moved for a rehearing of the matter nor appealed 
the matter to the Supreme <:our:. see also Utah Code Ann. 
-- ---
§ 54-7-16: " No co u rt o f t hi s stat e ( ex c e p t the supreme Co u rt 
to the ext:ent herein specified) shall have jurisdiction t.o 
review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision of the 
commission • " Yet., by instructing and allowing the jury 
to make the findings i: obviously did in reaching its verdict, 
the Court allowed an impermissible collateral attack on the 
Order of the C:>mmission. Th a t act i o n cannot ~ e p e rm it t. e d t o 
stand. 
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POINT II I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERR8D IN R8?USING TO RULE THAT THE LIABILITY OF 
MOUNTM.IN BELL, IP ANY, IN ES'l1ABLISHING :;.ND OPSRA'rING I1':-IE I:H8R-
CEP·rs IS LIMITED BY 'r,2\RI FP. 
A. t various stages in this case, Mountain Bell 
requested the trial court to enter an order limiting its lia-
bility, if any, to the extent allowed by tariff (R. 259-279, 
Tr • 5 9 ~ -5 9 8 , 5 9 9 -6 O 4 , 77 5 - 7 7 7 ) • The trial court erroneously 
rejected all of these requests. 
The only damages claimed by the A.tkin firm flow fr~m 
the intercepts placed by Mountain Bell as the direct result of 
an error made in printing the directory. 
section 20(S) (3) of the Commission's tariff provides: 
The Telephone Company's liability arising 
from errors in or omissions of directory 
listing shall be limited to and satisfied by 
a refund not exceeding the amount of the 
charges for such of the customer's service 
as is affected during the period covered by 
the directory in which the error or omission 
occurs. 
Similarly, Section 20(G) (5) states: 
Al? a rt Ero m t he c red i t a 11 ow an c e stat e d 
above, no liability shall attach to the 
telephone company for damages arising from 
errors, mistakes, omissions, interruptions, 
or delays of the telephone com?any, its 
a,3ents, servants or employees, in the course 
of establishing, furnishing, rearranging, 
moving, terminating, or changing the service 
or facilities (including :he obtaining or 
furnishing oE information in respect thereof 
or wit:h respect t.o subscribers or users of 
the service or facilities) in the absence of 
gross negligence ~r willful misconduct. 
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The 1 i ab i 1 it y o E Moun:. a i n 3 e 11 , i f any , t. o t h e f\t '.<i n f i rm , i s 
limited by ~hese provisions. 
Courts have long recognized that such tariff limita-
tions serve the 9ublic interest by contributing to lower rates 
for utility service. In an opinion of ·Justice Brandeis, 
'i~estern Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 250 U.S. 566 
(1921), the United States Supreme Court firmly established the 
pr i n c i p 1 e t hat r: e g u 1 at o ry age nc i es, i n set t in g r ates a n_d r e g u-
1 at in g utilities, have the inherent power to set reasonable 
limits on the liability of such utilities. such limitations 
cannot be looked at in isolation, but must be examined in the 
larger context of the overall duty of the regulatory agency to 
supervise and set rates. The Court stated: 
The limitation of liability was an inherent 
part oE the rate. The company could no more 
depart from it than it could depart from the 
amount charged Eor the service rendered. 
Id. at 571. 
Since the Western Union case, the courts in this coun-
try have consistently held such tariEEs to be both valid and 
binding. A recent case, Allen v. General Telephone Co., 20 
Wash. \pp. 144, 573 P.2d 1333 (1978), sets forth the state of 
the law regarding such tariffs: 
Virtually all jurisdictions have enforced 
such limitations and disclaimers of liabili-
ty, whether contained in a filed tariff or a 
private contract, unless the company's 
negligence is willful or gross. 
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The rule which disclaims or limits the tele-
phone com?any's liability Ear damages 
resultinr.J from a failure to print this ini-
tial listing is one which affects the 
charges for basic services rendered. Wit:h-
ou t such a rule the company would have to 
raise its rates commensurate to its in-
creased liability risk. Id. at 1336-37. 
see also, Vlaters v. Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 
P.2d 1151 (1974); Wilkinson v. New En1land ·relephone & Tele-
graph Co., 327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.2d 413 (1951); State ex rel. 
Mount a i n s tat e s Te 1 e p hon e & Te 1 e gr a p h Co . v. Dist r i c t Co u rt , 
1'50 Mont. 443, 503 P.2d 526 (1972); Shoemal~er v. ~1ountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 38 Colo. App. 321, 559 P.2d 
7 21 ( 19 7 :) ) ; .J • M eye r & Co . v • Il 1 i no i s 8 e 1 1 Te 1 e oho n e Co . , 8 8 
Ill. A.pp. 3d 53, 409 N.8.2d 557 (1980); Garrison v. Pacific 
No rt h we s t 8 e 11 Te 1 e eh on e co • , 4 5 o r . A.pp . 5 2 3 , 6 o 8 p • 2 a 12 o 6 
(1980). 
The trial court. erred in failing to he>ld that the 
liability of Mountain Bell, if any, is limited by the t:arifEs 
above quoted, in allowing the jury to consider the question and 
in failing to instruct the jury correctly as to the limitation 
( ·r r • 7 7 5 - 7 7 7 ) • 
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?OINT IV 
PLAINTIF2' FAILED ·ro PRODUCE ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OP LOSS OP 
BUSINESS CAUSED BY MOUNTAIN BELL'S ACTIONS. 
Even if Mountain Bell's 1 iability, if any, we re :10t: 
limited a3 a matter of law by an applicable tariff, the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to find compensatory damage 
Eor loss of business because there was absolutely no competent 
evidence that plaintiff suffered any actual loss of business 1s 
l, a result. of the actions of Mountain Bell, either in the print-
ing error, the mechanical intercept or the live operator 
l~ intercept. 
la ~. The i\ t kin Fi rm ' s c la i m E or 1 o s s of business i s an 
impermissible claim for attorneys' fees. 
The plaintiff's only evidence of business loss was the 
testimony of John Miles, a member of the firm, and a chart, 
gxhibit 2 7, prepared by him and admitted ovec objection. { A 
copy o f t hi s ch a rt i s Append i x B i n t: hi s b r i e f . ) The chart 
related the :]ross income of the plaintiff in the years 1979, 
1980 and 1981 and demonstrated that the firm's gr~ss income for 
each of the years 1930 and 1981 was substantially higher than 
the previous year's income. I t a 1 so c e> n ta bed Mr • M i 12 s ' pro-
jections as to what the firm's income should have been but Eor 
the intercepts. 
The evidence purpor~ed to show a loss of gross income 
in the fourth quarter of 1980 (the period during which t:he 
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mechanical intercept was in place for approximatel1 36 hours). 
However, each of the three shareholders of the Atkin firm test-
iEed t.hat the income oE the firm was produced by their legal 
services and that in the final quarter of 1980, they put in a 
substantial amount of time working on this case attempting to 
keep in effect the illegal order of the trial court ( 'T"r 
-- -. 
395-407, 149-451, 461-462, 538-544). The revenues of the 
plaintiff, accorjingly, declined in ~hat quar~er. In fact, Mr. 
Miles felt the revenue drop in the fourth quarter of 1980 was a 
direct result of his partners' work on this case (Tr. 543, 544) 
and that had it not been for their efforts in this case, :he 
Atkin Eirm's income would have exceeded his pr:>jections (Tr. 
5 4 7) • 
It is obvious that when the three shareholders of the 
Atkin firm were working on this case they could not.work on any 
other case and the revenues of the firm would decline. Thus, 
the ;tkin firm was in reality seeking, and was granted by the 
jury and court, attorneys' fees for their effor:.s in ob:aining 
and keeping in effect an illegal restraining order. The 
decrease in the Atkin firm's income in the four:h quarter of 
1980 resulted not from the lack of client's busin2ss, but 
rather from that firm's choice to pursue this action when it: 
could have been using that time to generate fees ~hrough work 
for cli2nt.s. Until shortly before the trial of this matter, 
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ne 
ot 
ut 
the ~tkin firm represented Ltself; hence the ~loss of busin2ssft 
erom so doing is nothin1J more than a concealed claim for 
at.torneys' fees, which under oft repeated decisions of this 
Court may not be awarded unless there is a specific statute or 
contractual provision permit.ting it. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. 
Gr: eater Pa r ·, Ci t y Co rp • , 5 9 2 P • 2 d 5 20 , 6 2 5- 2 6 ( Ut ah 19 7 9 ) ; B & 
R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 
(1972); Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah 2d 359, 412 P.2d 454 (1966). 
Here there is no such ~rovision. 
Moreover, even if the time spent by the i\tkin firm in 
f.)Ur:suing this matter were not construed as attorney's time, 
there is no basis for recovery of damages by a party (whether 
?laintiff or defendant), for time spent in attending to litiga-
tion, even though by so doing it may prevent the party from 
earning additional income. Mader v. St:ephenson, 552 P .2d 1114 
( Wyo • 1 9 7 6 ) ; s t o 1 z v. M cK owe n , 1 4 W ash. App • 8 0 8 , 5 4 5 P • 2 d 5 8 4 
( 19 7 5) • 
B. There was no evidence that an- loss of business 
was cause by the actions o Mountain Bell. 
Despite the fact that the plaintiff sought damages in 
the complaint for only the mechanical intercept operation (R. 
81-92), at trial, the Atkin firm was allowed over objection to 
introduce evidence of events and claimed damages incurred after 
Mountain Bell placed the live operator intec::ept pursuant ::o 
t: he or a e r o f t he Pu b 1 i c s e r vi c e Co mm i s s i on ( R . 8 1 - 9 2 , 12 9-13 0 A , 
Tr. 4-7, 113-15, 422, 510-13, 585). 
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Some clients of t:he ~tkin firm testified th2y ex?eri-
enced difficulty in reaching the firm after the sesond inter-
cept went into operation (Tr. 121-123, 277-280, 239-292, 
296-297, 408-409). Yet, all witnesses indicated that ~hey 
e v e n t u a 11 y we r e ab 1 e t o re a c h t. h e At k i n f i rm and t ha t each 
remained as a client of that firm (Tr. 123, 281, 292-293, 
298-299). Indeed, the Atkin firm was unable to 1noduce at 
trial even one witness to testify that any client or potential 
client was actually lost as the result of the telephone number 
d . 5 change an o~er3tor intercept. 
In Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957), this Court set E:irth the 
appr'.)priate standard for awarding damages in cases of claimed 
lost business: The plaintiff must show a direct causal rela-
tionship between the error and actual loss of business. In 
Gould, the plaintiff's listing was omitted from the yellow 
5The Atkin firm's only other evidence of alleged damage 
was a chart (Exhibit 22, Appendix A herein), which is a summary 
of the number of telephone calls received (Ex. 19, 20 & 21). 
All were admitted over objection as a business record exception 
to the hearsay rule (R. 354-359). However, the testimony of 
Mr. Atkin was that this information was kept and g-~thered Eor 
this lawsuit (Tr. 351-354). It is thus not admissible under 
Utah R. Evid. 53(13) and the admission of it was error. see 
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Shurtleff v .. Jay Tuft& 
Co., Inc., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); Gull Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Louis A.. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756 (Utah 1978). 
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;?ages alt.ogether. PlaintiEf, an attorney, sought damages for 
loss of past pr:>fits, future t;>rofits, and punitive damages. In 
discussing the sufficiency of .Plaintiff's evidence of damages, 
the Court quoted from Shealy's, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone 
& Telegraph Co.' 125 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.S.C. 1954): 
nsince the plaintiff has failed to introduce 
any evidence even tending to show t:hat its 
gross sales would have been increased had 
the advertisement been published, the mere 
fact that the gross profits for a preceding 
period were in excess of the gross profits 
for the period during which the advertise-
ment was omitted from the directory is 
insufficient to show that the decrease in 
gross profits was the proximate result oE 
the defendant's failure co publish the 
advertisement. Their causal relation to the 
b reach i s p u re 1 y spec u 1 at i v e • " 3 0 9 P • 2 d a t 
g 04-3 0 5. 
The court in Gould also discussed Schwanke, 
Wisconsin ·re 1 e_ehon e Co. , 19 9 Wis. 552, 227 N. W. 30 
case even more on point. In Schwanke, the telephone 
after having printed the same telephone number for two 
Inc. v. 
(1929), a 
company, 
parties, 
a s sign ea bot h p art i es n e w numb e r s. The Court in that case 
reversed an award for loss of profits based on the evidence 
that sales for the period in question were less than those for 
preceding periods, stating: 
" The r e co rd i s b a r re n o f a ny e vi den c e t o 
indicate the loss of a single sale by reason 
of the error in the telephone book. The 
evidence furnishes no justification for a 
conclusion that plaintiff's sales were 
diminished by reason of such error. The 
amount awarded Eor this item of damages 
cannot stand." 309 P.2d at 305. 
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In Gould, ~he Court distinguished Shealy' s and 
Schwanke and did per~it recovery of some damages for past pro-
fits because Gould had actually produced ~vidence of a causal 
connection be:ween lost business and the directory omission (a 
fellow attorney testified that he did not refer several cases 
because he could not locate Gould's telephone number in the 
directory). 309 P.2d at 804-05. 
Because of the absolute lack of any evidence of a 
causal relationship between the Atkin firm's alleged diminished 
income and actions of Mountain Bell (whether in the printing 
error, mechanical intercept, or live operator intercept), the 
present case falls into that class of cases represented by 
Shealyis and Schwanke where recovery of damages is denied even 
though a plaintiff may show a loss of income. The raason for 
this rule is that a loss of income may occur for any number of 
reasons; without evidence of a causal connection, however, any 
award of damages would be pure specula t: ion. See Howe v. 
Pioneer Telephone Cooperative, 251 Or. 385, 445 P.2d 875 (1968). 
c. There was no evidence of any loss of ne~ income. 
The Atkin firm's failure to introduce any evidence of 
loss of net profit is likewise fatal to its claim £Dr damages. 
Virtually all of John Miles' testimony, and the main damage 
exhibit: (Ex. 27) related solely to gross i:-icome figures. Miles 
did eventually state that the firm had certain expenses (with-
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out specifyin~ the amount) and that che net income for the fir~ 
was $63,179.00 for 1980, but he did not provide any information 
t '.J i n d i cat. e ·,v he t he r t he f i rm ' s e x: pens e s f o c o t he r ye a r s ~v ~ re 
the sa:ne, gr2ater or less than for 1980. q2nce, there is no 
basis in the evidence from which the jury could conclud~ that 
any damage occurred (i.e., by comparing net earnings for 1980 
against net earnings for 1979 or 1981). In Ga r c i a v • Mou n t a i n 
States Tele9hone & Telegraph Co., 315 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 
19 5 3 ) , t he Co u r t he 1 d th a t a 1 t hough p 1 a int i f f ha d shown a 
decrease in gr::>ss earnings, the failure to pr::>ve net loss pre-
eluded recovery of any damages where the plaintiff's listing 
was omitted from the directory. The :our: stated: 
But loss of gross earnings alone affords no 
acceptable basis for compensatory damages, 
unless they are in some way related to the 
loss of net. earnings There is 
nothing to indicate or from which the 
claimant's net loss can be deter;-nined with 
any degree of approximation; and there is no 
suggested met: hod for determining the amount 
of the loss suffered by reason of the 
decrease in gross receipts, if any. 
Instead, the jury was left to pure guess and 
speculation. Id. at 168-5 9. 
Accord, Deaktor: v. Pox Grocery Co., 475 E'.2d 1112, 1115-17 (3d 
Cir., 1973); Pcofessional Rodeo Cowboys Association v. Wilch, 
smith & 8 rock, 4 2 Co 1 o. i\p p. 3 O, 5 8 9 P. 2 d 510 , 513 -14 ( 19 7 8) ; 
Lepola v. Schroeder, 532 P.2d 370 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). 
a e ca use o f t he At k i n f i rm ' s f a i lure t o show a r ea 1 
loss of net 9rofits, and the absolute Eailure to show a causal 
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re 1 at ions hi 9 bet wee n c Li i me a 1 o s s o f bus in es s and :1 o u n ta i n 
Bell's actions, the jur1's award of compensatory damage is not 
supported by any competent evidence and should be reversed. 
POI NT V 
·rHERE rs NO BA.SIS IN LAW OR IN Tq 8 E"vIDENCE! FOR AN AWARD OP 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, the evidence 
must show ( 1) that t:he defendant commi':.t.ed a wrongful act; (2) 
that defendant's act was willful and malicious; and (3) that 
the plaintiff suffered actual damage as a result of defendant's 
act. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), Kesler v. 
Rogers, 342 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), Calhoun v. Univer3al Credit 
Co., 106 Utah 166, 146 P.2d 284 ( 1944). Th.: i\tkin firm has 
f a i 1 e d o n a 11 t h re e po i n t. s a n d t he Co u r t e r re d i n f a i 1 i n g t o 
dismiss this claim and in permitting the jury to consider it. 
A. Mountain Bell's actions were not wrongful. 
The Ackin firm's claim against Mountain Bell is based 
on the two intercepts placed by Mountain Bell on the Atkin 
firm's lines. The first (mechanical) intercept was i?laced in 
resi;>onse to a vehement complaint by Allen, Thompson & Hughes 
that the Atkin firm's telephone number had been listed for it 
in the directory and hence telephone calls i~tended for i~ were 
going t.o the Atkin firm. Mountain 8ell's only other alterna-
tive was to maintain the status quo, which would ;?erpetuate 
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confusion eor the general calling ?Ublic and make the ;.:kin 
firm the recipient of calls ':Jy persons seeking legal services 
from the A.llen firm. The interces>t allowed each fir:n ':o 
receive the calls intended for it. Given the available choices 
and considering its duty to serve all its subscribers and the 
general public, Mountain Bell chose the most reasonable solu-
tion. This was the finding of t.he C:Jmmission when it consi-
d e red , a n d f o r t: he p u rp o s es o f t hi s 1 i t i g at i on , d et e rm i n e d t hat 
question. 
The second ( 1 i ve operator) inter:=ept was placed pur-
suant to an 1Jrder of the Public Service Commission, after a 
hearing in which the Atkin firm participated and after this 
Court affirmed the Order. In this instance, Mountain Bell had 
no choice; if Mountain Bell had failed to place the second 
intercept, it would have been in contempt of the Commissi.on 
order. ( Ex • 3 5. ) 
Th2refore, Mountain Bell's actions in placing the 
intercepts, as a matter of law and fact, were not wrongful and 
form no basis for liability of any kind. See Sokol v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 418 P.2d 255, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 573 (1966). 
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B. Mountain Bell's actions were not willful and 3ali-
cious. 
In Calhoun v. Universal Cr-=dit Co., 1J6 Utah 166, 140 
P.2d 284 (1944), this Court delinea:.e::l and discussed :.he ele-
ments required for punitive damages: 
"'The par~y must know that the act is wrong-
ful and must do it intentionally without 
just cause or excuse. If he acts in good· 
faith and in the honest belief that his act 
is lawful, he is not liable for punitive 
damages even though he may be mistaken as to 
':.he legality of his act.'" 
" 'To j us t if y a r e cover y o f e x em p 1 a r y d am-
ag es, the act causing :he injury must be 
done with an evil intent and with the f>Ur-
9ose of injuring the ?laintiff, or with such 
a wanton and reckless disregard of his 
rights as 2vidences a wrongful motive.'" 
146 ?.2d at 288 (emphasis in original, cita-
tions omit:t.ed), quoting from Patrick v. 
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 
2 3 3 Mo. App. 2 51, 118 S. W • 2d 116, 12 6 ( 19 3 8) 
a n d f r om c r y mb 1 e v. M u 1 vane y , 2 1 Co 1 o. 2 0 3 , 
210, 40 P. 499, 501 (1895). '" 
see also Stein v. Diamond State Telephone Co., 146 A. 737 (Del. 
super. Ct • 19 2 9) • 
There is absolutely no evidence that Mountain Bell 
knew its acts were wrongful nor that it acted with any intent 
to injur~ the \tkin firm. At the very least, Mountain Bell 
believed that it had proprietary control of the telephone num-
bers by virtue of the tariff and that an inter~ept was the most 
reasonable means of solving a problem and providing service ~o 
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its subscri~ers and the genenl ?Ublic. The Public Service 
co mm i s s i on O r: d e r a n d s u? r 2 me Co u rt a f f i rm a t i on c o n f i rm e d t ha t: 
belief. 
c. The Atkin Eirm sufferad no actual loss of busi-
nes s. 
It is well established that in an action for damages, 
an award oE punitive damages cannot stand unl2s3 the ?laintiEf 
is entitled to recover compensatory damage. Maw v. Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy "Jistrict, 20 Utah 2d 195, Bo P.2d 230 
(1968): Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954). 
As :he Atkin firm has failed to prove that it suffered any 
~ctual loss of business as a rasult of Mountain Bell's actions, 
the award of punitive damages must be reversed. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this matter, the trial court erred in refusing to 
dis mis s t he \t k i n f i rm ' s c 1 a i m s , which we re based on l y o n 
actions taken by Mountain Bell pursuant to tariffs and orders 
of the ?u::,lic service 
permitting the Atkin 
Commission. The Court fur: her er red in 
firm to introduce evidence of events 
occurring after the Order oE the Public Service Commission, 
because it had not pleaded any claim for dama3es arising after 
t ha t o rd e r • ·rh e t r i a 1 co u rt t h u s sub j e c t: e d ~·~ o u n t a i n Be 1 1 t o 
liability for compliance with the tariffs and orders of the 
Public service Commission, which as a matter of law and policy 
it may not do. 
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The trial court erroneously retried issues alre~dy 
heard and resolved by the Public Service Commission, in ·1iola-
tion of statutes oE the State of Utah and the principle that a 
public utility should not be found liable for complying with 
the tariffs and orders of the Public Service Commission -~ par-
ticularly an order en:ered after consideration of a case where 
all parties had participated in the administrative proceedings 
leading to the order. 
The trial court erred in permitting the jury to con-
sider the claims of the Atkin firm, which failed to present any 
competent evidence that it sufEered loss of net income and the 
evidence it did produce demonstrated that the clai~ed loss of 
business was, in fact, a claim for attorneys' fees which should 
not, under Utah law, have been awarded. 
The trial court erred in allowing the jury to return 
an award for breach of contract or negligence in excess of the 
the liability limitation clauses contained in the tariffs 
governing the relationship between the parties. 
The trial court erred by refusing to perinit Mountain 
sell's theory of its case to be submitted to the jury in the 
jury instructions. 
F'inally, the Court err:ed in permitting the jury to 
award punitive damages when there was no basis in law or in the 
evidence for such an award. 
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On the basis of any or all ot these errors, thi3 Court 
should reverse the judgment of the trial court, rule that the 
i\.tkin firm has no cause oE action against Mountain 3ell and 
remand the case with directions to the trial cour~ to dismiss 
the complaint with prejudice. In the alternative, should this 
couri: determine that the errors of the trial court: require a 
retrial of the matter, it should remand for retrial under such 
directions as the couct deems appropriate after vacating the 
judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of July, 1982. 
of and for 
PA.RSONS, BEHLE & LATit18R 
185 south St~te street 
p. 0. 80 x 18 5 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34107 
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